The COVID-19 crisis has touched every aspect of social and political life in countries the world over, and armed conflict is no exception. However, while the world economy has slowed to a halt and international travel has generally ceased, political violence continues in many regions.

While UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ call for a global ceasefire on March 23rd was met with encouraging responses from many state and non-state actors, its effects on the ground are complex and difficult to predict. To gather insight on the potential effects of COVID-19 on the prospects for renewed peace efforts, I interviewed Dr. Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, a Research Director at the Peace Research Institute Oslo.

Daniel Odin Shaw (DOS): Could you tell us a little about the projects you are currently working on at PIRO, and how these intersect with the current coronavirus crisis?

Håvard Mokleiv Nygård (HMN): The immediate precursor to this is an on-going project we have, a collaboration between PRO and ETH Zurich, which has been building the first global systematic database of ceasefires in civil wars. When the corona epidemic hit, and especially after the UN Sec. Gen called for [a] global ceasefire to help communities combat the pandemic, we started seeing a growing number of armed groups and governments that announced ceasefires. We decided to start keeping track of these to see how they played out.

DOS: Are there any early results that are particularly surprising, or any ceasefires which are especially unexpected?

HMN: Initially I guess you could say we were somewhat surprised by how many groups and governments responded to the call.

DOS: Are most of the ceasefires directly related to the UN calls for a global ceasefire, or are there examples of more bottom-up efforts?

HMN: At the moment I think most of the ceasefires we’re seeing are more or less directly related to the call. This doesn’t mean there aren’t *also* bottom-up features to this, but the exact timing of them are clearly related to the UN Sec-Gen call.

DOS: Ceasefires often aren’t particularly durable. What are some of the likely challenges when it comes to turning these ceasefires into more sustained peacebuilding exercises?

HMN: So, unfortunately, the data now suggests that these ceasefires haven’t been very durable at all. They might have signaled good intentions, but they were not matched by international support — the UN security council still hasn’t been able to agree on a resolution for instance — and usually weren’t properly monitored. As such, we’re now seeing levels of violence increase again in many countries [where] we saw an initial short-lived lull in fighting.

DOS: It’s still early days, but does the evidence so far suggest that many of these ceasefires are holding, or have there been frequent violations? What are some key indicators that we should be looking for when judging the success of these efforts?

HMN: Unfortunately no, evidence suggests they are not holding. Across countries from Colombia, to Sudan, to the Philippines we see that levels of conflict-related violence are stable or increasing, meaning that ceasefires have not had much of an effect on the ground.

DOS: The UN is calling for a global ceasefire, and this would apply to both low-intensity conflicts (such as in the Indonesia-OPM) and high-intensity conflicts such as in Syria or Yemen. Are there different challenges in these different cases?

HMN: Absolutely. High-intensity conflicts with more evenly matched actors require much more painstaking negotiations and trust between the parties. For low-intensity conflicts the armed groups are often better off calling a ceasefire. If nothing else just to give themselves a ‘breather’. In any event, though, monitoring a ceasefire and holding the parties accountable is crucial for its durability.

DOS: The current crisis has opened up opportunities for peace, but also potential opportunities for greater repression from autocratic governments. Are there any particular trouble spots relating to this?

HMN: Unfortunately yes. We see many governments, both already autocratic regimes and seemingly (though not really) democratic ones such as Hungary, use the pandemic to defend curtailing civil and political rights and to give themselves wide and broad emergency powers. Now there’s definitely a place for such powers in a crisis such as this, but it has to be constricted by some kinds of checks and balances. I fear that we will see many regimes tighten the autocratic screw as a more or less direct consequence of this pandemic.

DOS: What obstacles are there to the creation of such an international conflict resolution and peacebuilding regime, and what steps could the international community take to move in that direction? For example, the UN has recently found it difficult to facilitate peace and has run into problems when it comes to cooperation between Security Council P5 members, but I am also keen to hear your thoughts on other challenges.

HMN: A security council resolution is absolutely needed. The UN really can’t act with much credibility without it. So, at the moment, we see that this was a nice ‘call’ but not terribly much more. The international community needs to step up, and P5, especially China, the USA, and Russia, have to be able to collaborate just a little in this.

Although it is yet early in the COVID-19-induced peace process, several themes are clearly emerging following the global ceasefire call.

Firstly, almost every country experiencing conflict is willing to engage with this call. This is understandable given the difficulties of simultaneously juggling a security and health crisis with limited resources. However, this does not mean that all of this engagement represents a genuine pathway towards peace. Many states and non-state groups may be using the ceasefire as a way to regroup, while continuing to pursue conflict through less direct means. The early evidence bears this out, with some countries experiencing greater — rather than reduced —violence.

Similarly, many opportunistic, autocratic, and authoritarian-leaning governments are using the crisis as a way to strip away civil liberties — a trend that could well lead to greater conflict and political violence in the future. Another challenge to curbing these negative trends is the UN’s inability to enforce a truly effective global ceasefire, given the practical challenges presented by the infectiousness of COVID-19 as well as the persistence of great power antagonism with the P5 on the U.N. Security Council.

The International Scholar will continue to explore these emerging trends and highly heterogeneous outcomes in a series of articles following the effect of COVID-19 on conflict and political violence around the world over the next few months.

Daniel Odin Shaw

- Director, Political Violence & Conflict Prevention Programme
- Twitter: @DanielOdinShaw
- LinkedIn: Daniel Shaw

Edited by: Cameron Vaské

All views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of The International Scholar or any other organization.

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