In the face of the current pandemic, the international community and the concerned parties in Yemen must congregate to build a final, binding solution for the conflict.
If ever there was a country burdened by a convoluted patchwork of actors, interests, and catastrophes, it is Yemen. The country has lost the better part of the last decade to political upheaval and socio-economic collapse. What began as part of the Arab Spring movement against the government of then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh is now an interminable contest of conflicting domestic and international interests and a bleak future for Yemeni citizens.
In a great irony, the COVID-19 pandemic might be a harbinger of peaceful times for Yemen. After more than 5 years of war and a severe humanitarian crisis, multiple ceasefire declarations by the Saudi-led coalition, plummeting oil prices, and a significant redirection of funds towards the domestic healthcare sectors of the coalition members (amidst numerous other developments) might finally convince the warring parties to agree to a durable peace accord.
If You Break It, They Will Come
The regime of ex-President Saleh — which lasted for over three decades — was known as corrupt, abusive, and nepotistic. In 2011 as the Arab Spring took over parts of the MENA region, Yemen saw massive popular protests, fueled in particular by widespread unemployment and economic decline in the country. President Saleh was forced to step down from power in 2012. He was offered legal immunity — as part of the ‘GCC Initiative’ — in return for the transfer of power to Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, his erstwhile deputy. The handover led to a political vacuum in Yemen.
The Houthis (a political and armed group belonging to the minority Zaidi Shia community based largely in Northern Yemen) and the Hirak (a separatist group of Southern Yemen), amongst other, smaller tribal groups, opposed this move and the Houthis went on to capture the capital, Sana’a, in 2015. The chaos that ensued was of concern for Saudi Arabia – as the aggression initiated by the Houthis (an ideological rival for the Saudi state) in their native Sa’dah suddenly made the Saudi southern border insecure. To add to this, the instability of the internationally recognized Yemeni government – an ally of Saudi Arabia – meant that the latter might lose its influence on the Yemeni state. Most importantly, the Saudi state feared undue Iranian influence (through the Houthis) on its neighbouring state. The Saudi-led coalition was formed primarily in response to this move. What the coalition envisaged would be a swift in-and-out assault to topple the Houthis resulted in an intractable conflict that has cost Saudi Arabia — the coalition’s de-facto leading power — money, manpower, assaults on its own territory, and a humiliating conflict of interests with its coalition partners in Abu Dhabi.
The conflict in Yemen has not drawn nearly as much international attention and sympathy as its counterpart in Syria, yet just as many international actors are mired in this conflict. Iran is allegedly supporting the Houthis by supplying their forces with training, funding, and arms – on the grounds of a shared ideology and Iranian interest in increasing its sphere of influence. The U.S. and the U.K. are the most prominent players, given their role in providing the Saudi-led coalition with arms and intelligence. The US has both a commercial interest in selling arms as well as a strategic interest in containing Iran, as well as AQAP and ISIS, through its support for the coalition. France and Germany have played similar roles.
Other major international actors, including Russia, Turkey, and China, have not become directly involved in the war but are nonetheless eager to profit from its ruins. Russia, unsurprisingly, has both maritime and geopolitical interests in Yemen. In fact, it has supported the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council in Yemen in order to assert a degree of influence over the Southern Yemen coastline. China is also invested in a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Yemen — not only because post-war reconstruction will allow for lucrative deals, but because the conflict’s spillover effects in the strategic Gulf of Aden and Bab al Mandeb Strait hinders the flow of Chinese goods to Africa and Europe.
Pandemic or Panacea?
While the ‘beginning of the end’ has been regularly predicted since at least 2019, it seems that the COVID-19 pandemic might prove to be the panacea for this conflict. Three recent announcements show promising signs of an imminent end to the fighting: First, in recent UN-sponsored talks in Geneva this September, the internationally recognized Yemeni govt. and the Houthis agreed to swap over 1000 prisoners ; second, in June, the government and the Southern separatists announced a ceasefire in order to implement the 2019 Riyadh peace agreement; and third, in April, the Saudi-led coalition announced a temporary unilateral ceasefire. All announcements must, of course, be taken with a pinch of salt - one came at the heels of the takeover of the strategic Socotra Islands by Southern-backed forces, whilst another was rejected by the Houthis on the grounds that Saudi bombings and blockades still continue.
The current pandemic has led to some adverse outcomes for the Gulf region, and in particular for Saudi Arabia and the UAE — the two principal members of the coalition. These include a record drop in the global demand for oil (and consequently of oil prices) and the large-scale repatriating immigration of migrant/expat labour in the Gulf region; and a significant COVID-19 caseload that calls for the diversion of financial resources from military spending towards the domestic healthcare sector. Within Yemen, the Houthis have been accused of suppressing information on the COVID-19 caseload; they have also forced shops and businesses to continue operating as usual in order to continue profiting from extortions. However, many sources have found that the virus is already spreading in the country and that the healthcare system, which had already collapsed due to Yemen’s cholera outbreak, is incapable of controlling the spread of the virus.
Hence, the conflict urgently needs to progress to the stage of peacebuilding and reconstruction. The primary focus must be on healthcare, potable water, and the restoration of domestic institutions such as the judiciary, state military, and banks. Reinstatement of public and civil society that undergird a free press, education, and employment generation must immediately follow if the country is to achieve any kind of stability.
A Pandemic-Induced Path to Peace in Yemen
Half a decade of war and multiple negotiations later, it is evident that peacebuilding will be neither easy nor quick. Humanitarian issues will be the last thing to drive peace home. Ultimately, financial and political incentives for the warring parties will prove to be the key factors in negotiations.
While the United Nations, particularly through the UN Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths, is already playing a key role in monitoring and mediating in the conflict, it could be advantageous if Oman were invited as a principal negotiator. Oman is the only GCC member state that did not join the Saudi-led coalition, and that enjoys cordial relations with many major external stakeholders - including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, which makes it a rather impartial arbitrator between the belligerents.
Moreover, Oman has a personal stake in the resolution of the conflict given its sizable Western border with Yemen, and its desire to stem the flow of extremist groups and Yemeni refugees from across the border. Oman has been party to past negotiations on the Yemeni conflict. It had proposed a Seven Point Plan in 2015, which indicates that it possesses detailed context and experience of the conflict and consultations, respectively. This is also important because the UN might not be trusted by all parties to serve as a neutral arbiter. Its recent delisting of the Saudi-led coalition from a blacklist for aggression against children has drawn tremendous international flak. Another potential drawback is that within the UN, formal states such as Saudi Arabia and UAE might have a stronger say (not least because they are supported by Washington) than informal groups such as the Houthis, which would hinder negotiations. Therefore, the involvement of Oman can ensure a level playing field for all parties to negotiate.
What is vital, at present, is to affect an immediate cessation of on-the-ground aggression. The viability of any future peace rests first and foremost on a complete and durable ceasefire. In the past, ceasefire announcements in Yemen have notoriously failed. Such a ceasefire is today more conceivable than ever before, as the pandemic has made an already expensive war even more painful to finance for all parties. As discussed above, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are faced with increased financial burdens on their healthcare systems in the face of COVID-19, plummeting oil prices, and a large-scale return of migrant workers that formed the pillars of their economy. Even Iran, which is said to be financing the Houthis, is faced with the same problems and crippling American sanctions which also restrict its financial wherewithal. Given that these countries have to now rebuild their own (post-oil) economies with limited resources, it is increasingly logical and gainful that the war in Yemen ends.
Once this can be achieved, the next goal would be to achieve a tripartite agreement between the Saudi-backed internationally-recognized Yemeni government, the Houthis, and the Southern Transitional Council (the so-called ‘separatists). This is the most necessary, and yet the most difficult step. The conflict in Yemen has been nothing but a contest for influence over territory and institutions– so much so that cracks appeared within the Saudi-led coalition too. No party would be willing to end the war without receiving a slice of the pie. Therefore, a transitional power-sharing arrangement between the Yemeni govt., the Houthis, and the STC is needed, which would each be responsible for top-down post-conflict rebuilding of the territories under their control. This should be temporary until the reconstruction reaches a viable stage, and it should allow for new and standardized elections thereafter.
The longstanding grievances of the Houthis and the Southerners (and the myriad tribal, sectarian, and regional sub-groups under them) of discrimination on sectarian and regional grounds, respectively, must urgently be addressed by establishing a strong federal structure with regional autonomy. This is imperative for harmony in a socially heterogenous country like Yemen. However, merits, or the lack thereof, of Southern secession must be addressed. Not only would secession cause economic distress and a diplomatic challenge for Yemen’s neighbors, it would also put South Yemen in the precarious position of dealing with terrorist outfits alone, given their sizable presence in Southern Yemen. Given that the UAE has been supportive of the STC and warm to the idea of secession for some time now — eyeing the southern coastline as a potential zone of influence and unfettered access to strategic shores — the UN and Oman would have to work hard to convince the UAE of the demerits of secession. For Saudi Arabia, too, dealing with one unstable neighbor would be easier than dealing with two.
An inclusive division of powers such as this must be made conditional upon the immediate removal of obstacles to procurement and distribution of aid by all three parties in the process. Key ports, including Hodeidah, Aden, and Ras Issa should be monitored by a UN agency (such as the UNMHA in Hodeidah) and facilitate the free passage of commercial goods and humanitarian aid — most critically, food grains, medicines, and equipment, and healthcare workers. The Houthis would also need to assent to stopping extortion and manipulation of the business sector before their demands can be met.
Another key factor of negotiations must be the establishment of a formal and unified Yemeni military that is inclusive of the various military subgroups in the country. At present, various militias control disparate parts of the country. Concerted efforts must be made to unify them at the regional level, if not conscripted and retrained into a national force.
Previous peace negotiations have outlined many viable solutions that failed to materialize only due to a lack of intent. If the current set of negotiations is intended to be final and binding, parties have the luxury of drawing on past advice — particularly upon those solutions presented in the 2011/12 National Dialogue Conference outcome and the GCC Initiative, as well as the 2018 Stockholm Declaration. This will make consultations rather convenient as a suggested political and economic structures for post-conflict Yemen already exist. Parties need to simply agree upon additional material demands. Two particularly viable solutions are outlined in white papers resulting from previous summits:
“Revenues of the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa shall be channeled to the Central Bank of Yemen through its branch in Hodeidah as a contribution to the payment of salaries in the governate of Hodeidah and throughout Yemen.” (Stockholm Declaration 2018); and
“The division of powers and responsibilities shall be clearly defined in the constitution of the federal state. The central authority shall not interfere with the exercise of authority of the executive, legislative, judicial and administrative bodies of the other levels of government in their areas of exclusive responsibility, except in exceptional circumstances as regulated by the constitution and law, and only for purposes of ensuring collective security, essential common standards or to protect one regional authority from interference by another.” (NDC Outcome 2012)
It is also imperative for the negotiation process to include the Yemeni civil society, as well as Iran. Yemen is fortunate to have an active civil society that has been vocal throughout the conflict, although its capacity is severely restricted by continuing violence, lack of funding, and a fractured bureaucracy. In particular, women’s rights groups in Yemen have been proactive in highlighting how women and children have been doubly disadvantaged by the war. Therefore, it is imperative to include these grassroots voices in the peace process so as to authentically and accurately represent the grievances of citizens.
As for Iran, for all the blame it has received for its support of the Houthis (which, analysts argue, was highly exaggerated at the beginning of the war but has increased over the years) it has not been genuinely included in the negotiations. It would be wise to include Iran at some stage of the process and explore its willingness and potential to both advise the Houthis as well as limit their aid and arms supplies. In return, Iran can benefit from exporting oil and essential goods to Yemen.
Beyond economic and humanitarian concerns, members of the Saudi-led coalition must understand that Yemen is their permanent neighbor and hostility is not a long-term option. All parties must gain some and lose some in the process of achieving a compromise that brings stability to the wider region. Reaching an agreement is also necessary to ensure the security of the strategic Bab el-Mandeb strait and the Gulf of Aden, both of which are crucial for regional as well as global trade.
Another Syria — Or A New Beginning
The Middle East does not need another version of the Syrian crisis, and it should therefore prevent it. Even though socio-economic collapse and endless warfare has shattered Yemen, the conflict has not yet seen direct involvement of influential players such as Turkey, Russia, and China who are continually seeking to expand their footprint in the region. The primary adversaries still remain Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and multiple factions within Yemen, thereby making conflict resolution negotiations simpler than in conflicts with greater international involvement.
It is imperative that the concerned actors along with the USA, the UK, the EU, and the UN take the negotiation process up a notch and make use of the war-weariness and economic constraints brought about by the pandemic. The Middle East has long been a volatile region with the capacity to impact most parts of the world; therefore, any feasible opportunity for peace should be immediately seized. Not only would this be financially wise for the primary adversaries, it will also give impetus to uninvolved countries to invest in the rebuilding of Yemen — rather than invest in a potential “winner” somewhere down the line. An effective peace accord will also give way to lifting Yemen out of poverty and disease — unfortunately however, history is evidence that humanitarian concerns have never been the reason for ending wars. For years, analyses have predicted the end of the conflict in Yemen.
At this time of global upheaval, it is not only the moral imperative, but the duty of the international community to set aside geopolitical gainsmanship in the pursuit of peace. As those within the international community with the greatest leverage to affect change, it is incumbent upon major regional powers like the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to at last silence the guns, binder up, and move past the phase of never-ending conflict to perform the hard work of diplomacy, transformation, and peacebuilding.
All views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of The International Scholar or any other organization.
Photo Credit:
Yemen, by United Nations Development Programme, Flickr,
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