As political leaders around the world address the COVID-19 crisis, many have seen their approval ratings increase, in some cases dramatically so. It is, of course, premature to paint a full picture of how well different countries are dealing with the global pandemic. However, this bump in the polls appears manifest in countries seen to be better managing the crisis, such as Germany and Denmark, as well as those struggling, such as Italy, the U.K. and the U.S. What is at the root of this shift in popular support, how long will it last, and what might it mean for the upcoming U.S. presidential election?

Rally ‘Round the Flag
The link between international crises and domestic popularity is well-established in political science. John Mueller’s 1973 book “War, Presidents and Public Opinion” sets out the “Rally ‘Round the Flag” effect — a theory that has successfully predicted public responses to high profile events from the Gulf War to the assassination of Qasem Soleimani. Mueller found that the U.S. President saw a pronounced increase in public support following both diplomatic and military events, particularly large-scale wars such as those in Vietnam and Korea. This boost in public support is driven by the tendency of party supporters to support their leader, and of a section of the population to support the president during any “specific, dramatic and sharply focused” crisis, despite their own partisan identification. Of course, “hawks” and “doves” still have different opinions about the crisis, and while not every event produced the same effect, in each case there was a large enough segment of the population that reflexively supported the President to produce a consistent effect.

While Mueller and his contemporaries tended to focus on war and events related to the Cold War, the Rally ‘Round the Flag effect can also be applied to the current crisis provoked by the COVID-19 pandemic, and provides a useful heuristic for analyzing the electoral fallout it is causing. Pandemics are by their nature international; moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has been framed, particularly in the U.S., in adversarial terms. China and the U.S. have frequently butted heads over both the practicalities and the discourse surrounding the virus, while conflict and cooperation over crisis response and resources between other countries have frequently structured the international response. In addition to the undeniably international character of the crisis, the national leader in most countries is personally leading and directing crisis response efforts and initiatives.

My Country, Right or Wrong
Patriotism might seem like an overly simplistic driver of this effect, but it is the core of Mueller’s theory and remains broadly accepted — not without merit. It makes sense that leaders receive a boost in polling from successful action to address a crisis. Margaret Thatcher’s popularity following the Falklands War is the best example of this, but the U.S.’s involvement and leadership in the multilateral Korean War was an event which arguably boosted Presidential approval ratings by boosting the nation’s world standing. These examples of conflict-driven popularity have even led to a body of work positing that leaders deliberately choose to enter “diversionary wars” as a way of boosting their domestic popularity. However, even embarrassing failures can result in a fairly pronounced and durable increase in leadership approval. Contrary to Mueller’s initial expectations, there was no significant difference in the strength of the Rally ‘Round the Flag effect between the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Bay of Pigs, despite the latter resulting in a humiliating fiasco on the world stage. In Mueller’s words, “the public seems to react to ‘good’ and ‘bad’ international events in about the same way.” This led him to theorize that patriotism and a sense of national unity were the driving forces behind this phenomenon. People fear disunity in times of crises, and leaders benefit from the popular will to band together, whether or not a leader's handling of the situation is competent or successful. This explanation fit well with later socio-psychological approaches, with emphasized the role of in-group dynamics in the formation of political attitudes.

But For How Long?
While the Rally ‘Round the Flag phenomenon occurs fairly consistency, the magnitude and durability of this support are more heterogenous. Political scientists point to two interrelated factors to explain this: elite consensus and media coverage. The initial stages of a crisis are often marked by a relative absence of criticism — elite or otherwise — which is where we find the initial boost in approval ratings. Whether this boost remains durable or not seems to depend on the way in which elite debates are portrayed in the media. In most cases, the media coverage of elite discussion of major events becomes negative, at least in part, which shortens the longevity of Rally ‘Round the Flag effects. This appears to be increasingly likely given the rise of partisan polarization — particularly in the West — which makes it difficult for presidents to reach skeptical members of the public with credible messages.

Some notable exceptions have been major conflicts. The most significant and long-lasting Rally ‘Round the Flag effect was seen in the aftermath of 9/11 and the ensuing War on Terror. President Bush’s approval rating increased from 51% on September 10 to 90% on September 22, the highest rating ever recorded for a U.S. President. It also remained extremely durable, and stood at 68% on November 10, 2002. The War on Terror is perhaps an exception that proves the rule. The national trauma of 9/11 helped create a hegemonic discourse, driven by both elites and the media, in favor of a strongly militarized response against a clear and manifest target. This is not something which current political leaders can count on.

The Coronavirus Trump Bump?
The increase in President Trump’s approval ratings differs from the archetypical effect in many ways. Firstly, the magnitude is barely comparable: Trump’s approval ratings soared to their highest point in his presidency to an 49% in one late March 2020 poll and to an average of 46% by April 16th. In comparison to the approval ratings boost for other country’s leaders in response to Covid-19, it seems even less impressive. U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson has seen his approval rating shoot up from 47% at the start of February to 72% by late March, according to a poll. Other European leaders have seen a similarly impressive boost, including French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who have seen their approval ratings rise by 13 points and 11 points respectively since early March. Even in America, State leaders have seen a far more favorable response from voters. Michigan’s Democratic Governor Gretchen Whitmer now has 60% approval ratings in the key battleground state, while Republican Mark DeWine of Ohio is scoring 80%.

The comparatively smaller magnitude of the Rally ‘Round the Flag effect is further dulled by the strong likelihood of a long countrywide recession. Unemployment has soared and the American (and world) economy is facing a deep slump. All else equal, economic performance is the best predictor of an American President’s reelection chances. This is particularly true of Trump, who looked set to base his campaign around strong job numbers and a booming stock market — both of which are now imperiled, in part due to the actions (and inactions) of the Trump administration.

Nonetheless, President Trump’s campaign arguably doesn’t need a long-term poll boost to benefit from the Rally Round the Flag effect, with the election only seven months away. However, he won’t receive the same kind of support from a widespread sense of national unity and media consensus that redounded to Bush’s benefit in the post-9/11 period. Whereas Bush’s crisis was provoked by a clear adversary, and so provided a clear public enemy against which to unify, Trump’s crisis is natural and incarnate in nature.

The administration has nonetheless worked — to some effect — to manifest adversaries “responsible” for the crisis. Trump has repeatedly called COVID-19 the “Chinese” or “Wuhan” virus, implied that the Chinese unleashed the virus on the United States as an act of bio-terror, and faulted the country for its “lack of transparency,” despite having praised China for their transparency just months before the crisis reached its current fever-pitch in the United States.

China is not the only target that Trump and his administration have chosen to blame for the crisis. He has also publicly reprimanded the World Health Organization’s response to the pandemic, claiming that it has poorly managed crisis response measures and failed to alert the world to the severity of the crisis with sufficient time (despite clear evidence to the contrary). In a now-familiar maneuver to observers of American politics, Trump is also deflecting criticism of his administration’s response to the crisis by casting blame the Obama administration, claiming that he inherited a broken system. In fact, Trump inherited a comprehensive pandemic response system from previous administrations, which he and John Bolton promptly dismantled in May of 2018.

The Trump administration’s haphazard approach and increasingly obvious culpability — in addition to the U.S.’ emergence as a global hotspot for Coronavirus cases — mean that this could demonstrate a rare case of political leader negating their own Rally ´Round the Flag effect within a matter of weeks. His approval ratings have now dropped to 43%, the sharpest drop of his presidency and lower than his pre-virus average. This means that, much like the price of U.S. oil futures, Trump’s rally effect has gone negative.

Despite attempts to foster national unity by declaring himself a “wartime president”, President Trump cannot expect to escape criticism over his handling of the crisis. This inevitable criticism will only be heightened if the anti-lockdown protests he and his right-wing donors are encouraging lead to an increase in cases, as many credible experts predict. Combined with the now-shrinking economy, historically sharp rise in unemployment, and the administration’s notable absence of a robust, long-term plan to mitigate either, Trump’s political futures look bleak. His administration’s proclivity for seizing shipments of personal protective equipment (PPE) — which which State and city governments, hospitals, and regional health networks have bought and paid for — and collecting them in a Federal stockpile isn’t helping him win any popularity contests, either.

Joe Biden, his likely opponent in November, was admittedly muted during the first few weeks of March as the Trump administration passed bipartisan legislation aimed at mitigating the economic effects of the lockdown. However, Trump has faced serious criticism and pushback from Governors — including by fellow Republicans — as he proceeds to simultaneously claim to be saving the States hardest-hit by the crisis and while also claiming the States are suffering because they aren’t mobilizing the necessary resources (which the Federal Government is supposed to provide in times of national crisis), all while maintaining that State Governors’ stay-at-home orders are excessive.

The media environment is also highly polarized, offering little benefit of the doubt to Trump. He has in turn responded with belligerent briefings and attacks on reporters and his political rivals, as well as threats to fire his own high-level advisors. Evidenced by his most recent briefing, which was described as “rambling”, “unhinged” and “off-the-rails", this is far from the supportive media environment needed to sustain a poll bounce through to November.

With all that said, Trump has succeeded in the face of controversy and division before. Indeed, he ran an election in 2016 that thrived on it, and has never been a candidate to seek national consensus. Political polarization and a highly partisan media environment, as well as the ever-growing importance of social media, mean that many of the old rules about chasing consensus and the median voter no longer apply as clearly as they once did. President Trump retains the support of an active and committed base who pay little attention to what CNN or the New York Times say about his pandemic response. Energizing the base — including by throwing the blame for the Covid-19 crisis onto China, the WHO, the Obama administration, and his domestic opponents — appears to be his game plan and his best path to reelection. If the Democratic opposition fails to similarly energize their own base, then it is quite possible that Trump could triumph in the Electoral College in November, despite his failure to capitalize on national unity during this crisis.

Daniel Odin Shaw

- Director, Political Violence & Conflict Prevention Programme
- Twitter: @DanielOdinShaw

Claire Elliott

- Guest Contributor

Edited by: Cameron Vaské

All views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of The International Scholar or any other organization.

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