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Analysis | U.S. Foreign Policy in Latin America Desperately Needs a Course Correction

Naman K. T. Habtom

On May 3, a U.S.-backed mercenary group sailed to the fishing village of Chuao in Venezuela, only to be immediately apprehended while attempting to land. Even as events were unfolding, it became apparent that the small group was plotting to capture and overthrow Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. This spectacular fiasco — featuring two former Green Berets — resulted not only in public ridicule for Washington but also provides a rare glimpse into the continued pursuit of decades-old failed interventionist policies by the U.S. 

While this recent episode might appear an anomalous deviation, it is in fact representative of past American conduct in the Western Hemisphere. Trump’s heavy-handed interventionist tack is by no means unique to his administration but pervades the history of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. In an increasingly multipolar world order, in which the United States will increasingly find the need to call upon friendly states and allies to pursue its values and interests, decades of flawed foreign policy ought to be discarded in favor of creating more constructive relationships with paramount respect for sovereignty. Engaging the United States’ Southern neighbors should not be an exercise in dominance for Washington — let alone one that is destructive.

Sinking Statecraft
The evolution of events in the Venezuelan catastrophe that culminated in the now-infamous Macuto Bay raid followed the same playbook that has been used throughout Latin America yet consistently backfired. The reliance on proxies or intermediary groups (in this case the Florida-based Silvercorp USA) has enabled the deployment of combat units while simultaneously preserving plausible deniability. To that end, the rejection by both the U.S. and Colombia of alleged complicity proves unsurprising. Though it remains to see to what extent, if any, the Trump administration was involved in the incident, the rise in bilateral tensions with Caracas has undoubtedly contributed to an environment in which similar methods are considered and perhaps executed — albeit be it through proxies.

The Silvercorp operation involved two U.S. special forces veterans augmented by several dozen of ex-Venezuelan soldiers, including deserters accused of drug trafficking. In an uncanny parallel to the Kennedy administration's use of Cuban exiles in the failed Bay of Pigs operation, the Trump administration undoubtedly sought out non-U.S. military combatants to eliminate the potential for U.S. domestic political fallout and further distance the U.S. from any culpability. Rather than direct the operation itself, the U.S. equipped and coordinated opposition forces to pursue a private-sector path with the same end goal.

In addition to their illicit nature, past and present interventions and political interference have consistently led to greater regional instability that, in turn, infected U.S. domestic politics.

The weakening of state institutions has contributed to increased corruption, drug trafficking, and emigration with thousands fleeing — many of them to the United States. This has in turn contributed to the toxification of immigration policy debate in the U.S. over the past few years is to a considerable extent rooted in the volatility of Central American states. 

The violent overthrow of the Venezuelan government — especially by Washington — would undoubtedly trigger another wave of mass emigration that would affect both neighboring states and the United States itself. As of 2019, roughly 4.6 million Venezuelans have already fled the country, and more are taking flight. As Syria’s neighbors are overwhelmed by the refugee crisis in the Middle East, so too are Venezuela’s neighbors under considerable strain from the influx.

The Narcoterrorism Excuse has Sailed — and Crashed
In March 2020, the United States Department of Justice indicted Maduro, along with several aides, on charges of narco-terrorism. While this might be understood as a post-9/11 fusion of the global war on terrorism and the war on drugs, in fact, far closer to repeat the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989, when President George H.W. Bush ousted then-Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega following allegations of drug trafficking. Noriega — who was previously on the CIA’s payroll — became increasingly defiant to U.S. hegemony, and he was subsequently captured and put on trial in Florida. Likewise, the ultimate goal behind the Silvercorp disaster was not merely the removal of Maduro from office, but also his rendition, presumably to the United States. The deployment of U.S. military force is unlikely to produce the necessary stability that would benefit either the inhabitants or the development of a fruitful and mutually beneficial relationship with the United States.

The reemergence of tactics reminiscent of the Reagan/Bush-era is partially a result of the presence of some legacy policymakers, which are generating a repeat in conduct, and likely, in the outcome as well. Case-in-point: the U.S. Special Representative for Venezuela is Elliott Abrams, who masterminded some of the most violent and notorious operations in Central America. While publicly lamenting the lack of an American invasion of Nicaragua in a bid to oust the Sandinistas — the left-wing force that governed the country throughout the 1980’s — he convinced the Sultan of Brunei to provide $10 million for the Contras, a right-wing opposition force to which the U.S. Congress explicitly voted to block U.S. financial support due to their use of political terrorism. Yet these policies, as they were implemented throughout Central America, ultimately resulted in greater regional violence and instability, facilitating the cocaine trade that flowed into the United States. Decades later U.S.-Nicaragua ties remain frosty. The lesson Washington should have taken from the experience is that such policies are not only counterproductive in shoring up regional stability, but also fail to foster stronger bilateral ties.

It is a lesson the Trump Administration has failed to learn. The same old rationale pervades U.S. defense and foreign policymaking in the Western Hemisphere. The apparent desire to continue unilaterally imposing the Monroe Doctrine only serves to exacerbate tensions with major powers — including Russia and China — while simultaneously serving as a justification for forceful regime change. While President Obama did not replicate some of his predecessors’ policies, his executive order declaring that Venezuela posed an “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States” laid the foundation for further escalation by the Trump Administration, which has reactivated old-tactics. 

Burning the Sails to Spite the Wind
The removal from office of leftist leaders of the Pink Tide often followed a hybrid process, beginning with foreign pressure and brought to completion by domestic followthrough. Back in late 2019, President Evo Morales was forced to resign from the presidency by the Bolivian military following an election in which the Organization of American States (OAS) claimed was marked by electoral fraud after conducting an audit. While the White House was quick to praise the resignation, claiming that “Morales’s departure preserves democracy and paves the way for the Bolivian people to have their voices heard,” the OAS claims failed to hold up to scrutiny. A study commissioned by the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) and conducted by two MIT researchers found the accusation of electoral fraud to be fraudulent itself. Yet by that point, it was too late — the allegations had already sparked enough domestic ire to enable a coup.

While the removal of figures like Morales from the political scene and the ascendancy of their successors may serve the short-term tactical goals of some U.S. policymakers, it introduces domestic political polarization into U.S. foreign relations that weakens Washington’s soft power while resulting in instability and often violence in Latin America, which in turn undermines U.S. national security. Clashes between protestors and newly-formed governments have become more common, resulting in long-term destabilization which only serves to benefit political extremists and criminal elements. 

At the same time, as U.S. relative power is decreasing, the popular attitudes of foreign powers become increasingly important. While high-level formal ties between Trump and other ideologically aligned leaders may be strong with several countries, the United States’ favorability has declined over the past several years in places like Brazil.

Charting a New Course
The United States desperately needs a new Good Neighbor Policy towards Latin America. By producing positive incentive structures as well as renewing commitment to economic prosperity Washington can create stronger and friendly bonds with its Southern neighbors. The recent trend of coercing small states into signing safe third country agreements (through which a country may host asylum seekers and migrants that are seeking entry to a different state) is merely a bandaid on the wounds caused by regional instability. By simultaneously threatening to cut off economic aid and pursuing policies that undermine regional security, the U.S. is undertaking an exercise in futility. The root causes of emigration must be addressed. Instead of throwing its military weight about, it would be wiser for Washington to embark on a Marshall Plan-type trajectory that applies its economic muscle to development in the region. Any future rethink of U.S. Latin American foreign policy must put a real emphasis on cooperation and shoring up the institutions that ensure long-term stability and reduce migratory pressures before it finds its credibility washed out.

The United States’ status as the dominant regional hegemon remains afloat but is adrift — and sinking fast. With the U.S. share of global GDP diminishing, its soft power corroded by numerous unforced errors of the Trump administration, and the rising tide of regional and global powers, the unilateral imposition of force is no longer seaworthy. In order to secure the United States’ long-term relationship with Latin America, the shift towards a foreign policy based in amity and respect for sovereignty is not only a moral imperative, but a geopolitical one. 

Regardless of the direction that political winds blow at home, Washington needs a long-term foreign policy course correction. For the United States to chart a new relationship with Latin America, it must avoid the shallows of regime change and seek the deeper waters of engagement, or risk washing ashore yet again.

Naman K. T. Habtom

- Staff Contributor

Edited by: Cameron Vaské, Mark Dovich

All views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of The International Scholar or any other organization.

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