Analysis | Syria's Displaced COVID-19 Victims
The Assad regime’s ineffective, stunted, and selective response to the coronavirus is exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Syria and threatens to upend what little stability the country has achieved since ISIS’ defeat.
Catastrophic Context
‘Vulnerability’ is a loaded word that has plagued Syria’s regime and population — both settled and displaced — for over a decade. At the tail end of its civil war, the Assad regime was left with a nation in desperate need of re-construction and stability to cost an estimated $260 to $400 billion. This is an amount that the government does not have the capacity to generate and it is unlikely that it will dedicate such a fortune to the nation’s re-construction, given its continued obsession with policies designed to punish those the regime considered enemies of the state. The invocation of Decree 63, for example, allowed the government to seize the property of those who fall under Counterterrorism Law 19 — a deliberate loophole that resulted in the seizures of 70,000 homes and land from those accused of terrorist activities by 2017.
Towns controlled by the Syrian opposition, such as Qaboun and Darayya saw entire neighborhoods razed and blocked off in order to prevent civilian returns. Assad’s political priorities have also resulted in fewer cities gaining permission to reconstruct their infrastructure and centers of commerce. While disruptive for those already settled or recently returned to their homes, poorly executed reconstruction efforts are felt much more greatly by Syria’s displaced population than its already-settled population.
The Syrian conflict has produced the largest proportion of internally displaced people (IDPs) in recent history; millions of people who have, in most cases, spent years living in camps and fighting poverty to support their families. For these individuals, the security enjoyed in their homes is inadequately substituted with IDP camps that rely on increasingly dwindling aid. Despite significant de-escalation in violence Damascus’ sluggish, almost counterproductive, re-development policies are hindering the rate at which Syria’s displaced peoples are able to return to their communities.
In fact, the number of returnees to areas such as Aleppo actually decreased from ~75,000 in 2018 to less than 24,000 in 2019. In total, only a third of those displaced from Aleppo have so far returned — numbers and trends that are not exclusive to this city. Indicative of the existing reconstruction failures and presenting a challenge to peacebuilding efforts, Syria’s displaced population now also lives within a compromised environment, significantly worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic. Without a drastic change to these policies and therefore, the conditions resulting from them, this fractured country is likely to see a resurgence in radicalization and violence.
The primary drivers of Syria’s precipitous political instability are its own economic and humanitarian instability. The Assad regime has experienced difficulties with exerting its authority over the state as a whole because of the deterioration of those prior two, interrelated crises. Consistency in governance, at this point, is also lacking as the country is split between the regime, the Kurds and Turks in the North, and opposition forces, and Al-Qaeda affiliate Hayat Tahrir as-Sham (HTS) to the East.
While economic growth requires a long-term, gradual process, an increase in the number of returnees (and a simultaneous decrease in the number of refugees and internally displaced peoples) is a more tangible and visible indicator of successful peacebuilding efforts, which would aid the regime in its quest to gain the support of, and legitimacy from, the Syrian people. However, the downward trend of returnees to previously major population centers like Aleppo is a sign that the government’s efforts are not as effective as they could be if the goal is to prevent a recurrence of widespread conflict. The COVID-19 pandemic and its associated economic and societal effects magnify the hardships faced by internally displaced civilians, make their return home even more difficult, and will probably result in the resurgence of armed conflict if current conditions and policies do not improve.
The Pandemic and Post-Conflict Instability
Although Syria initially reported a lower level of cases or deaths relative to the rest of the world, including its regional neighbors, the country’s instability and crippled health care system has almost certainly resulted in poor testing and underreporting of cases. As of June 2020, only 54 public hospitals in the entire country were functional. Despite protections applied to hospitals and medical staff within the Geneva Conventions, a great proportion of Syria’s health infrastructure was targeted and destroyed during the civil conflict. Even then, the hospitals that remain are plagued by high staff turnover and significant equipment shortages. Medical professionals comprise a large portion of those reported as testing positive for COVID-19 in Syria, contributing to the state’s stunted response to cases. The few hundred ventilators available in the country are unequally distributed, as Assad directed the bulk to regime-controlled areas and gave preference to regime-loyal areas specifically in yet another display of biased governance. Volunteer technicians in areas lacking adequate equipment are forced to construct their own makeshift ventilators under the pressure of high demand and low supplies.
The situation within IDP camps is even more critical. An assessment of 210 IDP camps within Aleppo and Idlib revealed that 95% lacked a functioning medical point or center within or in close proximity to the camp and that the number of doctors within the camps has steadily decreased since January of 2020. It’s not just a lack of healthcare which has increased the risk of contraction and death from COVID-19 — poor sanitation, malnutrition, and limited access to potable water in the camps weaken immune systems, leading to greater vulnerability and severity of illness.
The fact that the healthcare system serving Syria’s internally displaced population is so overwhelmed will have catastrophic effects on the security of a group in an already precarious situation. Even where some camp authorities continue to enforce restrictions to preventing inhabitants from leaving without permission — loosely justified as necessary due to the risk presented by ISIS to personal security — current conditions are likely to inspire IDPs to flee without their IDs and the undocumented migration of IDPs will then can act as a vector for further COVID-19 transmission.
It remains to be seen whether, in the event that standards are significantly improved, efforts could mitigate the risk of this occurrence, but camp conditions are unlikely to improve in the near future. The time-bound provision within the UN Security Council Resolution 2165, which outlined the logistical terms for cross-border humanitarian aid into Syria, lapsed on July 10, 2020, and was only given limited renewal under Security Council Resolution 2533. The resolution allows cross-border aid to enter Syria through only one crossing point — the Bab al-Hawa crossing between Syria and Turkey. This reduction from the previous four points of access to just one greatly reduces humanitarian access to Syria and, given that the majority of IDPs rely on cross-border aid from groups such as the UNHCR — especially in areas like the Idlib province which has witnessed an increase in displaced civilians since January 2020 —, restrictions on aid will further destabilize the small amount of security that is afforded through existing humanitarian measures.
Rising Cases and Resurgent Conflict
COVID-19 not only threatens to exacerbate Syria’s humanitarian crisis, but also poses a threat to its national security. An unchecked epidemic within such a large at-risk populace in the midst of economic and social instability has the potential to fuel the resurgence of conflict in the form of extremism just as much as it can stifle conflict in the short-term. The country’s own lockdown, mandated to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, resulted in restricted mobility for civilians and military personnel alike; halting military exercises and operations conducted by ground troops has shifted conflict dynamics enough that the resurgence of widespread violence is again possible.
Although coalition forces managed to drive the Islamic State (ISIS) mostly out of Syria by the end of 2018, militants still occupy rural, eastern areas of the country. Regions like Deir Ez-Zor province remain hotbeds for ISIS militants, who continue to conduct frequent IED attacks and shootings, emboldened by the quarantine limiting the capabilities of its current adversaries — principally local anti-ISIS militias and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Hayat Tahrir as-Sham (HTS) maintains a presence over the final rebel-held city of Idlib in western Syria and has remained in a stalemate with smaller jihadist groups in the area. However, the struggle to control the spread of COVID-19 and the limited mobility of HTS forces is leaving the stalemate on ever shakier ground. Both ISIS and HTS are using the spread of COVID-19 combined with the regime’s poor response to validate their ideologies while fear and frustration over current conditions have boosted the effectiveness of their propaganda and recruitment efforts.
As civilians become disillusioned with IDP camps in deteriorating conditions, opportunities to establish a local source of income remain limited (both due to poor infrastructure and COVID-19 measures). Areas like Idlib face weak governance from conflicting local groups. In the face of so many challenges, many are turning to Islamist groups for protection and structure. Over the past year, HTS became the strongest armed group in the Idlib province. Although it showed limited capacity to govern people in the areas it controls and often faces pushback from local religious leaders, it still retains power in a significant portion of the province. While most of its current operations are focused in Iraq — which saw a 200% increase in HTS attacks — the probability of an ISIS resurgence in Syria is now more pronounced due to the humanitarian crises and the failures of the regime’s ineffective re-construction policy. To reduce the number of civilians who may feel an increased need to turn to the security of jihadist-run camps or towns, there must be either an improvement of humanitarian-run facilities and/or effective coordination of redevelopment and reintegration for IDPs. Current local and governmental policies hinder the ability for either path to be taken.
COVID-19’s Impact on Syria’s Future
The humanitarian crisis in Syria seems to be worsening by the day, as millions of civilians continue to live in tents with limited or no medical care, food, or potable water. A lack of social and economic safety nets and limited access to new sources of income has also increased poverty and forced IDPs to rely heavily on external sources of authority, whether it be local religious leaders or jihadist groups, for some semblance of security. In the midst of the COVID-19 crisis, increased distribution of ventilators and PPE for medical professionals and volunteers, as well as greater education on the infectiousness of the virus, are crucial for the protection of both IDPs and the medical staff tasked with caring for them. These actions would help minimize the loss of life experienced within camps ravaged by COVID-19.
As humanitarian aid has become increasingly limited and ineffective in assisting the large number of people who require it, the Assad government must step up and employ a longer-term strategy to direct funds currently employed in developing property and infrastructure for middle and upper-class consumption to IDP relief or risk a more desperate and frustrated population than he faced in 2011. Unfortunately, Syria’s collapsed economy has halted local redevelopment and international sanctions on trade have not helped the state stay above water during the crisis caused by a decade of civil conflict and a pandemic. The Assad regime is also unlikely to stop its prioritization of regime-held redevelopment, as existing humanitarian assistance remains unevenly distributed among political lines.
As the state becomes poorer and poorer, alleviating the potential consequences of this humanitarian crisis must come from outside the state’s circle of corruption. Lifting sanctions could alleviate some of the economic pressure, but should only be considered if Syria consistently meets a clear set of conditions, beginning with equal distribution of aid and PPE for the thousands of IDPs within its borders.
There is everything to lose. Not only does the crisis threaten the lives of countless Syrians, but the delicate and imperfect stability the region has regained since ISIS’ defeat. Despite the rhetoric of many Western politicians, the Syrian conflict has not yet met its conclusion — terrorism and violence are already on the rise again. Without humanitarian aid and some semblance of effective and comprehensive governance, Syria risks a return to the state that fueled ISIS’ rise in 2013. It is imperative — as much for Syria as for the international community — that humanitarian aid reaches Syria’s most vulnerable before the entire region becomes a hotbed for COVID-19 and a renewed international security threat.
All views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of The International Scholar or any other organization.
Photo Credit:
COVID-19 Equipment to Syrian Arab Republic (05890241), by IAEA Imagebank, Flickr,
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