The Dayton Peace Accords didn’t bring peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina; they institutionalized violence.

Since the onset of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in 1995, The Dayton Peace Accords codified the institutionalization of ethnic division and structural and political violence against minorities in BiH. As a result, political violence has become a defining feature of the post-Dayton era Bosnia. Defined by the WHO as the deprivation and denial of basic fundamental rights, political violence is exercised in Bosnia through permeating ethnic conflict, which continues to destabilize an already dysfunctional state. The discriminatory electoral system enshrined in BiH’s constitution is a definitive example of the institutionalization of ethnic discrimination in Bosnia. It enables the ethnonationalist leaders to carry out acts of political violence against the minority communities.

As a result, the process of reconciliation and attainment of sustainable peace in the country still faces sizable obstacles a quarter-century after the signing of the peace accords in Dayton, Ohio. The problems persist regardless of the efforts of domestic and international actors to eradicate ethnic sectarianism through different peacebuilding initiatives.

Moreover, the challenge of ethnic conflict is exacerbated by the lack of support from the European Union to move the process of peacebuilding along. Furthermore, the barriers placed upon BiH by the Copenhagen Criteria — wherein a prospective member state must uphold democratic values and fundamental human rights — prevents BiH from joining the European Union outright. While the European Union is not responsible for BiH’s development, the lack of engagement of the EU more generally is placing the future of the country in serious jeopardy.

Institutionalizing Violence Through Peace
Emerging from a prolonged war by way of the Dayton Accords, Bosnia and Herzegovina seemingly assured nothing short of the institutionalization of the ethnic divisions that originally sparked the war. As part of the Dayton peace process, the accords established in BiH a consociational democracy between the three main belligerents — the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats — a model in which the state would have a tripartite presidency, with each president representing one of the majority ethnic groups. In bringing a halt to armed conflict, the structure of the peace process established a negative peace in the country.

The preamble of the Accords, which continue to function as the countries constitution, defines the Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats as the “constituent peoples.” Other communities are merely referred to as Bosnian citizens in passing. To put it simply, being one of the constituent peoples gives members of these ethnic groups explicit recognition of equal citizenship in the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is solely the right of these people to secure access to those jobs that are then allocated along ethnic lines. The ‘others’ are barred from accessing the same opportunities despite being Bosnian citizens.

The resulting system of ‘first among equals’ has been the causal factor for gross violation of the human rights of minorities like the Roma and Jews, starting by barring their social and political participation in the public sphere. Commenting on the situation, Irena Hadžiabdić — a member of the Bosnian Central Election Commission — remarked that the electoral system disqualifies her as a potential presidential candidate for the very fact that she does not belong to the Bosniak community in Zenica. The same blanket prohibition against occupying public office applies for all those who do not identify as Bosniak, Serb, or Croat. Beyond the political spectrum, all other major institutions in the country are also divided based on ethnic lines. The system of ‘ethnic quota’ governs the society and polity of BiH. In hindsight, peace came at a hefty price.

The Accords are liable for re-enforcing the wartime ethnic divisions which acted as a causal factor in instigating and fueling the Bosnian war. The legitimacy granted to the territorial boundaries carved out between 1992-95 has set a dangerous precedent in motion — in effect, that the reward for waging a successful armed conflict might result in the right to self-determination.

However, the drawbacks of the peace agreement do not negate nor minimize the overwhelming success in preventing the recurrence of war — more than two decades after it came into force. Considering the mass exodus of displaced persons as a result of the conflict, the Accords also enshrined legal remedies for the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). It allowed hundreds of thousands to return to their homes. It instilled a sense of belief among the survivors about the feasibility of restoring normalcy within a post-war state. 

This kind of assurance is crucial for the recovery of a society emerging from the ravages of war in order to initiate the peacebuilding process. The Accords are responsible for playing the role of a facilitator in beginning the transition to post-war recovery. The peacebuilding initiatives adopted by both domestic and international actors have achieved marginal success over the past years.

Nevertheless, politico-ethnic divisions and prejudice continue to hinder genuine reconciliation in Bosnian society.

The country’s future is primarily dependent on how stakeholders continue to mold the Bosnian society, directly or indirectly. At the same time, the transition to a post-war state free of ethnic conflict (if successful) will play a key role in determining its fate.

Tripartite Tribulations
The unique model of consociational democracy adopted by BiH has meant that wartime divisions would have to be introduced into the post-war state structure. It has prevented the enfranchisement of ethnic minorities in both the Republika Srpska and the Federation of BiH — the two governmental entities that comprise the country — that are represented at the presidential level. Extending the power of vetoing any legislation that appears to threaten the rights of their ethnic group to each of the Presidents has meant that, on numerous occasions, proposed legislation has come to an impasse. In some cases, this negatively affects members of one or more of the three groups represented.

However, despite the constitution’s recognition of the fundamental rights of all Bosnian citizens, the rights of the ethnic minorities outside of these groups remain disproportionately infringed upon or violated outright due to the lack of representation, as noted by political analyst Jasmin Mujanović. She claims the Accords have acted as a catalyst in the deepening of sectarian conflict in the country. It is also important to note that the legal framework governing elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina permits only Bosniaks & Croats in the Federation and Serbs in Republika Srpska to contest presidential elections. In this and other ways, the State fortifies ethnic demarcation that violates a fundamental democratic principle that allows all individuals to compete for public office.

Reaching down from the towers of government and mimicking patterns of discrimination in that institution, violence — of direct, cultural, and structural natures — stemming from unabashed ethnopolitics is further normalized. Firmly rooted in a conflicted and segregated education system, the policy of segregation enforced through this institution draws strong parallels to apartheid in South Africa. A direct consequence of the ethnonationalism that permeates the fabric of the Bosnian society, the socialization of segregation in children’s formative years often exercises great influence, leaving adults marked by sometimes deeply prejudicial ideas.

The socially engineered structure of prejudice has a significant bearing on the lives of ordinary citizens belonging to disenfranchised ethnic minorities. While on the one hand, they remain marginalized by society, they are nevertheless compelled to contribute to that very same society by fulfilling their civic duties as “equal” citizens, such as paying taxes. They consistently face difficulty when attempting to access equal employment opportunities in public and government sectors, affordable healthcare, and educational opportunities.

By and large, the Roma have borne the brunt of discriminatory practices. Ninety-five percent of the community remains unemployed due to the lack of equal opportunity.

Hate crimes continue to further plague BiH. The US Department of State’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2019 notes that ethnic minorities regularly encounter verbal abuse. Culturally significant sites to ethnic minorities are also often the subject of desecration. Banja Luka is at the epicenter of one such incident. In the post-war era, the authorities announced their intention to rebuild the Ferhadija Mosque. Like countless other mosques, it was destroyed by Serb forces in an attempt to erase the city’s Islamic heritage. One thousand Serb nationalists gathered in protest against the alleged slight. Witnesses recount how the rioters lit buses and prayer rugs ablaze in the vicinity. In the chaos that ensued, one individual was killed and eight people were wounded. The reconstruction of the mosque was made possible in 2016 by the combined efforts of the Turkish and Republika Srpska governments, as well as the Sarajevo Architecture Faculty, twenty-three years after the Serb forces reduced it to rubble.

As it is across sociopolitical issues in many countries, the role of the media and institutional authorities is crucial in defining the narrative of a post-war society. The media can either serve to internalize and exacerbate the existing divide between hostile actors or provide and shape a conducive atmosphere for conversation and reconciliation. More often than not, Bosnian media falls in the first category. 

State-controlled public broadcasts are employed as tools to disseminate propaganda demonizing opposing groups while denying culpability on the part of the dominant ethnic group, mainly regarding violations during the Bosnian war. The Freedom House has previously reported on the status of (IDPs) and refugees. They experience direct violence and intimidation if they choose to return to their native homes, situated in territories dominated by non-members.

Hate-crimes remain underreported as a result of classification or go unacknowledged as such by investigative authorities. Halisa Skopljak, who serves as the legal advisor at the OSCE’s mission in BiH claims that “when the data are classified according to the target or victim, it can be seen that the vast majority of the incidents are directed against groups or individuals based on their ethnic or religious affiliation.”

Among those whose cases are reported and publicized is Arin Hodzic. During the war, Mr. Hodzic fled Prijedor. As a Bosniak, he came under grave threat as the city fell into the hands of Serb forces. On his return, he confronted a disconcerting reality — ethnic hatred still permeated life in BiH. Serb nationalists compelled him to beg their forgiveness for his community’s past crimes and remove the Bosnian coat of arms sticker from his car. The incident only came before the public because of the video that was filmed by one of the perpetrators. While the authorities recognized it as a criminal offense, charges fell short of addressing the matter as an ethnically-motivated crime.

In Bijeljina, a teenage Romani succumbed to his injuries after a Serb neighbor assaulted him. A metal bar struck a severe blow to the back of his head. The court sentenced the perpetrator to seven years of incarceration for inflicting severe grave harm. However, the proceedings failed to recognize ethnic hatred or discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity as the motivation behind the assault.

Ombudsmayhem
Three Ombudsmen — public officials charged with protecting Bosnians’ rights by investigating charges related to violation of human rights and misconduct of the varied institutions — spearhead the Institution of Ombudsman of Human Rights for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here again, only those who are members of the Bosniak, Croat and, Serb communities are appointed as Ombudsmen, even though the ‘others’ are not legally barred from holding this office– “The Ombudsmen shall be appointed from among the constituent peoples (Serb, Bosniak, and Croat), which shall not preclude the possibility of appointing the Ombudsmen from among the Others.”  However, the facilitation of other groups’ membership within this institution is absent, which contributes to an atmosphere that is hostile for the progression of minority rights despite significant efforts on the part of NGOs and private citizens.

In its 2009 ruling on Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled against the discriminatory policy followed in BiH, following the appeal filed by Jakob Finci and Dervo Sejdic. The court ruled that the Bosnian constitution discriminates against ethnic minorities such as Romas and Jews. It is equally discriminatory against those who refuse to make their ethnic identity known. Despite advocacy by numerous individuals and organizations, BiH has thus far failed to incorporate the directives within the historic ruling. Attempts at reforming the constitution came to a halt due to the crisis of ethnic sectarianism plaguing the country. Bosnia and Herzegovina is home to perhaps the world’s most complicated system of decentralized governance. Within it, the absence of a cohesive decision-making process and tri-partisanship across ethnic divides and governance structures leave a nearly insurmountable obstacle in the path of constitutional reform. This is exacerbated by the lack of political will to incorporate the ruling of ECHR because it doesn't benefit any of the three major ethnic groups with political power.

Discussing the sentiment behind the filing of a motion against the discriminatory electoral system, Finci remarked that “while members of the Jewish community are victims of political discrimination, it is a result of the current electoral system, which is generally in violation of basic human rights. It is a problem that affects everyone.” For Finci, the provisions within the judgment would go some way to alleviating the mutual suspicion, grief, and hatred that have become entrenched in the lives of Bosnian citizens.

Post-Accord Peacebuilding
Cross-cultural dialogue, development of symbolic gestures, and diminishing the negative perceptions held by the antagonistic groups often guide the peace initiatives in a post-war state. Domestic actors have the highest stake in maintaining peace and stability in the country. After all, it is they who will find themselves at the frontline should another Balkan War erupt yet again.

The longstanding philosophy of the Center for Nonviolent Action (Sarajevo) is that addressing prior trauma is a necessary step in the construction of a post-conflict society. Over the years, it has organized fourteen conflict resolution workshops specifically for healing the survivors’ psychological wounds. The atrocities that took place during the war altered the ties between the ethnic communities. It is required for the members to engage in constructive debates and reflect on their past experiences. They must address the grievances and misgivings embedded in the post-war state. The CNA provides them with such a forum. In the recent past, ordinary civilians, as well as military veterans utilized the opportunity to reflect on issues such as their roles and attitudes during and after the war.

The use of appropriate symbolic gestures facilitates the process of reconciliation in a climate of ethnic sectarianism. The initiative adopted by a local NGO in the city of Mostar is a pertinent example. Veselin Gatalo and Nino Raspudić-led ‘Urban Movement’ erected a life-size statue of Bruce Lee in the center of the city. It is a notable fact that in the post-Dayton era, every other monument beside it has raised a public outcry by either one of the ethnic groups. Before the inaugural ceremony, Raspudić spoke about the sentiment behind their idea– “…in the city where everything is split/divided, we would like to remind that, outside of the vicious circle of national conflict, there still exist numerous things that are common to all inhabitants/citizens of Mostar.”

Walking Forward Hand-in-Hand?
The actors most involved throughout the peace process — the constituent peoples, the European Union (EU), and the UN, in particular — have achieved relative success in addressing the issue of ethnic sectarianism. At the same time, its institutionalization and re-enforcement by the Accords and the media, as well as the presence of fractured justice, has largely hindered the establishment of sustainable peace.

The ethnonationalist media, across the divide, continually perpetuates the demonization of the non-members. Many Bosnian Croats and Serbs remain attached to their history with the Nazi party and nostalgic about the genocidal campaign waged during the war, and level ethnic slurs such as ‘Wahabis’ and ‘Turks’ (referring to the Ottoman Empire) against the Bosniaks. 

While the Bosnian constitution grants the refugees and IDPs the right to return to their homes, the absence of a conducive and welcoming atmosphere prevents a large number of them from doing so. The presence of contradictory truths in the public domain and perpetrators’ denial of culpability during the war poses an obstacle in this regard.

Today, BiH is representative of a democratic farce. Ethnically motivated violence and harassment have compelled countless individuals to abandon the hope of starting anew — and continue to do so.

The system of ethnic consociationalism essentially froze the wartime ethnic divisions and boundaries, which —twenty-five years later —seem set in stone. In pursuit of negative peace, the Dayton Accords almost sidestepped justice. Ethnic sectarianism has proven instrumental in the instigation of political violence against ethnic minorities and conducive to further violation of fundamental human rights. As a result, people are unable to disassociate themselves from the wartime divisions and beliefs which guided the actions of countless others during the war.

Political violence promoted by the system of ethnic consociationalism is not only morally reprehensible for its discrimination against those who remain in the minority. It also lacks any scope or mechanism for the broader population to reach across the ethnic divide and address the hostility which permeates the fabric of the post-war society.

If those affected by the conflict are unable to reconcile their past grievances and misgivings, sustainable peace will remain an unattainable goal. While it is true that specific peacebuilding initiatives have achieved relative success, nonetheless, the widening ethnic divide hinders the overall process of reconciliation.

It is absolutely imperative to reverse wartime ethnic divisions through rigorous constitutional reform. The implementation of ECHR’s ruling would go a long way toward achieving that goal. The proposed modifications to the system of electoral politics require that all the Bosnian citizens have equitable access to opportunities in the public sphere.

Ideally, for the challenge of ethnic sectarianism to be eradicated at its roots, it would require a whole of society approach — bringing in former belligerents, all citizens of BiH, and international actors alike to completely overhaul the systems of governance established by the Accords and replace it with a new framework. However, “reopening the accords” may be the match that sparks the tinderbox, igniting another disastrous conflict, if it isn't handled meticulously. If poorly managed, ethnic groups of the constituent peoples represented by ethnonationalist leaders may perceive their fundamental rights to be threatened. Only with the cooperation of all stakeholders of the original conflict can the High Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina take decisive action to champion measures to begin the reconciliation process and bring about an end to institutionalized political violence.

Annex 10 of the Dayton Accord bestows the office High Representative (at this time, occupied by Valentin Inzko) with ‘Bonn Powers’, granting it the authority and legitimacy to dismiss those leaders who hinder the process of reconciliation in the country. There is precedent for such action. From 1995 to 2004, the Office of The High Representative removed from the office more than one hundred and thirty-nine officials, including judges, parliamentarians, and civil servants. The international and Bosnian communities must work jointly to reform the constitution while preserving peace in the Balkans by granting political and socioeconomic suffrage for those who face discrimination.

In the initial years after the end of the armed conflict, the political leaders rejected the proposition of establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (based on a similar framework adopted in South Africa). Nonetheless, its adoption and subsequent implementation would no doubt play a crucial role in normalizing the relations between groups across ethnic divides. The historical precedent set by the commission in South Africa makes it apparent that determined, genuine efforts at conflict resolution can prove successful even in countries affected by decades of hostility and ethnic violence. Additionally, individuals who have close associations with the people at the grassroots level and the political leadership must step up to bridge the existing divide. Such individuals must not only belong to the conflict zone but also be able to influence to bring together people from across the ethnic spectrum. Put simply, BiH needs a Bishop Desmond Tutu — a leader and symbol for unity and reconciliation — from within Bosnian society.

None of these changes, even taken together, guarantees a permanent solution. They merely open pathways to introduce changes in Bosnian society before the High Representative can hand over control to new, truly democratically-elected Bosnian officials. While some of these measures may be seen as interventionism that breaches duly elected officials’ sovereign authority, they are necessary both to ensure the integrity of the inter-state peace that the Dayton Peace Accords established and to enable the BiH to finally reconcile with the root of the conflict that ravaged the Balkans a quarter-century ago. Equally crucial will be participation and leadership from civil society that drives a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding. As the Bosnian proverb goes, "a tree does not grow from the sky.”

The last quarter-century saw successful and sustainable efforts to achieve inter-state peace in the Balkans, at the cost of institutionalizing ethnic divisions in BiH. The decisions that Bosnia and Herzegovina — and the rest of the international community — takes to address and resolve ethnic divisiveness and institutionalized political violence in the next quarter-century will not only determine its success as a candidate to the European Union, but its success as a country and nation for the quarter-century that follows.

Saman Kidwai

Research Assistant, Political Violence & Conflict Resolution Programme

LinkedIn

Edited by: Valerie Gatonye, Cameron Vaské (contributing)

All views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of The International Scholar or any other organization.

Banner photo credits:

• By U.S. Air Force/Staff Sgt. Brian Schlumbohm - [1], Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=6887750