Libya has become a chessboard for regional and foreign powers as Europe stands by, risking the creation of another geopolitical and refugee crisis in Northern Africa.

Nine years have passed since the Libyan revolution began in 2011, yet the country still finds itself in the midst of a civil war. The process through which the revolutionary forces — backed by an international intervention pursuant to United Nations (UN) Resolution 1973 and coordinated by NATO forces — overthrew Colonel Mu’ammar Al-Qadaffi, leading to the creation of a power vacuum that has yet to be filled. Hitherto, formal efforts on the part of the International Community focused on the UN-sponsored Libya Political Agreement (LPA) process with little success. The country remains divided between two principal political blocks which, in turn, reflect the two sides of the proxy war being waged by a plethora of regional and international powers. In the to-and-fro, non-state actors — including armed groups, militias, city-states, and tribes — are angling for power, making the country a veritable powder keg for another escalated conflict in North Africa. The International Community — Europe, Turkey, and Russia, in particular — must stop seeing the country as a ground for proxy competition and security hedging, acknowledge the failure of the LPA process, and begin a more rigorous and inclusive peace process that includes all major actors in the country. 

Principals, Proxies, and Politics
In 2011, as the Arab Spring was in full swing throughout the Middle East and North Africa, civil war broke out in Libya. Several armed groups and militias formed an anti-Qaddafi coalition, leading to the creation of the National Transitional Country on February 27, 2011. Given the violent reaction from then-President Al-Qaddafi, on 17 March 2011, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, authorizing member states “to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack […] from the government of Qadhafi”. NATO assumed leadership of the mission and its subsequent military intervention resulted in a decisive end to the conflict, leading to the swift defeat of Colonel Qaddafi’s forces and his capture and extrajudicial execution by rebel groups on October 20, 2011 in Sirte.

Following Qaddafi’s death at the hands of rebel groups in 2011, the country was plunged into a power struggle over what was supposed to be a peaceful and democratic transition of power which culminated in civil war in 2014 — dividing the country between two factions. Despite six years of conflict — and attempts by outside actors to sway the balance or bring the parties to the negotiating table — neither side has been able to gain a definitive advantage over the other.

Libya’s volatility and lack of governance created a border-porous region in Northern Africa through which many migrants, displaced persons, and victims of human trafficking are able to pass. Without a coordinated border control, Libyans fleeing conflict and other refugees flocked to the Libyan coast to seek asylum in Europe, provoking the migration crisis of 2015 in the European Union (EU). Regional conflict since that period — including the expansion of the Islamic State and other armed groups —  only served to exacerbate security concerns and political uncertainty in a corner of the Mediterranean that is of utmost strategic importance for the EU and its allies.

While there exists a complex mosaic of factions with competing interests, two principal factions have emerged in the power struggle and have consolidated their control over parts of the country: in Tripoli, the UN-approved LPA established a nine-member Presidential Council (PC) and a Government of National Accord (GNA), both headed by Prime Minister Fajez al-Serraj; in the Eastern part of the country, Khalifa Haftar and his army – the Libyan National Army (LNA) – maintains control over the majority of Cyrenaica and Fezzan.

Notwithstanding several attempts by the UN and the EU to advance a political agreement for a transitional government that would satisfy both sides, General Haftar launched an attack on Tripoli on April 4th, 2019 in a failed attempt to remove al-Serraj from the UN-recognized GNA, surprising the international community and bringing the conflict to an intractable and yet untenable stalemate. The deadlock persists in part because al-Serraj and Haftar both distrust and perceive the other as an existential threat, but to reduce the conflict to a personal feud and domestic factors is an oversimplification. The international community’s own divisions over the conflict have also limited the capacity for a peaceful transition and escalated the scale of the conflict.

Over time, the Libyan crisis has drawn in a kaleidoscope of intersecting and overlapping interests of numerous regional and international actors. On one hand, there are Western countries — principally those that led the 2011 military intervention that ended the regime of Muammar Qaddafi after forty years of leadership — which for the most part support Serraj’s UN-backed government in Tripoli.

While the United States and the United Kingdom have proven disinterested in the aftermath of Qaddafi’s fall, Italy and France continue to play leading but opposing roles. The two countries, in principle, should speak with one voice under the aegis of the European Union; however, the reality is more intricate. Whereas Rome has, since the beginning of the crisis, supported the activities of the UN that led to the formation of the GNA in 2015, Paris has recently shown itself to align closer with Tobruk's parliament and its leader, General Haftar. Nevertheless, in doing so, Paris has thus far succeeded in maintaining a certain level of plausible deniability. Despite clear signs of French involvement, it nonetheless works to keep its intervention in support of Haftar undercover, while simultaneously maintaining the veneer of a super partes role at the diplomatic level.

In contrast to France’s shadow diplomacy in Libya, the immense and overt economic and military support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and, to a lesser extent, from Saudi Arabia provides Haftar a significant military advantage over the government in Tripoli — far more than the Élysée’s sympathy offers. The UAE's intervention is part of a wider competition to expand its influence on a regional scale and to counter political movements related to the Muslim Brotherhood. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh's interventionism most notably resulted in the 2013 coup against the first democratically-elected president of Egypt, Mohamed Morsi (a member of the Muslim Brotherhood), followed by the return to power of General Al-Sisi.

Further complicating the dense network of international interests involved in the Libyan crisis are recent interventions from Russia and Turkey — two actors which until recently played marginal roles in the Libyan conflict — albeit with distinct motives. While only a few months ago saw only Italy, France, the UAE and Egypt at the forefront of engagement with either party, in recent months both Moscow and Ankara have played an increasingly stronger role in shaping the conflict, assuming an avant-garde position on the chessboard. The Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, supports Serraj for the same reasons that led the UAE to support Haftar, whereas Russia seeks to become the kingmaker for General Haftar to create leverage in a crisis which is sensitive to European interests.

The Blunder in Berlin
So far, the lack of common vision among foreign actors involved in Libya has stymied all attempts at a breakthrough for a Libyan peace process and post-conflict management. Nevertheless, 2020 started with a widespread desire — particularly in European capitals — to bring Libya’s conflict and its political instability to an end. To that end, Many policymakers across Europe put great hope in the Berlin Conference that took place on January 19th of 2020. The objective of the meeting was to build a solid basis for a peace process which, in turn, would lead to a negotiated solution to the conflict under the auspices of the United Nations. If nothing else, the conference well-represented, and included representatives from Algeria, China, Egypt, the UAE, France, Italy, the U.K., the Republic of the Congo, Russia, the U. S., and Turkey, as well as attendants from the Arab League, the African Union, the European Union, and the United Nations.

Chancellor Angela Merkel spearheaded the conference, leading the charge with a mantra best exemplified as “a solution to the Libyan conflict cannot be military but only political”. Yet not even the high-profile nature of the conference, extensive international representation, or Merkel’s diplomacy and determination were sufficient to convince the two Libyan leaders to physically attend the conference together. Instead, they remained at their respective hotels in Berlin and held separate meetings with Chancellor Merkel, who presented them with a proposed peace plan prepared by the German government.

On January 19, the conference's joint statement came after four hours of talks between international leaders. Merkel's impressive diplomatic footwork — thanks in part to Germany’s role as an honest broker given its impartiality with respect to rival factions and capacity to breach the diplomatic gap between permanent members of the UN Security Council — led to the successful signing of the 55-point document.

Despite the progress in bringing together the international community, the venture proved largely fruitless in uniting the Libyan factions behind a peace plan. Merkel’s hopeful address marking the occasion and celebrating the few substantial breakthroughs achieved in the German capital were quickly proven premature by the reaction of the two Libyan strongmen. Neither Serraj nor Haftar formally endorsed the joint statement. Much to Berlin’s chagrin, Haftar resumed his offensive against Tripoli a few days later.

While the majority of the international community remains committed to a diplomatic resolution to the conflict, at present, the diplomatic summit in Berlin will undoubtedly join the ranks of similar failed attempts at ending an endemic conflict in yet another country worn out by years of guerrilla warfare and instability.

Turning the Tide
“Berlin who?” might best summarize the view of the conference in today's Libya. Despite that it's been a short five months, the situation in-country has evolved in such a way that it seems a decade has passed since the inconclusive conference that took place in the German capital.

In the beginning of 2020, the international community dealt with a tired and discouraged Serraj — who received little more than lip service from his Western allies — leading a government at the mercy of local militias and in control of a small and chaotic mosaic of neighborhoods in the center of Tripoli. Facing him, a triumphant Haftar — backed by a coalition of influential and wealthy external powers — was content to allow the German attempt at diplomatic reconciliation to fail, and thus give way for a military invasion of Tripoli.

Now, while the international community is preoccupied with the global health crisis brought on by COVID-19, it seems the tables have turned in Libya. The offensive launched at the end of March by Serraj's GNA — perhaps named in poor taste, the "Storm of Peace” — has painted Haftar into a corner for the first time, forcing him to call a ceasefire for the duration of Ramadan — an avenue for de-escalation he had repeatedly rejected.

A series of strategic errors and external factors are responsible for the reversal. In late January, after wresting control of eastern Libya's oil infrastructure, Haftar decided to halt the export of Libyan crude oil — a critical source of income for his unrecognized government. Such a move – as the Economist wrote – turned against him since it is up to the Libyan central bank to pay the salaries of the state officials of eastern Libya under its control. "The general is aiming a gun at his head", said in this regard Tim Eaton, an analyst at Chatham House, a think tank based in London. 

Haftar’s suffered another blow after the LNA failed to conquer Tripoli after launching its campaign against the capital city in April. Haftar’s strategy was to decapitate the opposition government in a blitzkrieg before the international community had the chance to take countermeasures. Despite its sudden assault — and the  surprise backing of Russia, the UAE, France and Egypt — Haftar failed to break through the capital's defenses, leading to a long and exhausting siege of the city which ultimately weakened Haftar’s affiliate militias and depleted his resources. Finally, and most importantly, Turkey’s surprise and sudden increase in military support — supplying Tripoli with weapons, anti-aircraft defenses, drones, and mercenaries — fundamentally redefined the balance of power in the conflict.

Despite Ankara’s support for Serraj’s government, the outcome of the conflict is far from determined. Haftar still retains a heavy military presence and territorial control, which won't likely change in the short term. As long as the country remains the theatre of a complex game of chess between competing regional and international powers seeking to play kingmaker, Libya will remain divided. At present, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey are on the front line. If the success of the GNA rides on Ankara's actions, so too will Haftar's fate be increasingly written in Abu Dhabi than in Benghazi.

Syrianizing Libya
In the long-run, Libya runs the risk of becoming the next Syria and losing what little control over its sovereignty it still retains. Notwithstanding substantial differences between the two conflicts, the rise of foreign interference in Libya has brought the conflict dangerously close to becoming a semi-permanent feature of Northern Africa — wreaking havoc on the Libyan people and destabilizing neighboring countries. Ankara and Moscow appear to be reenacting their proxy conflict in Syria — where they maintain rivals in support of opposing sides while, on paper, they maintain committed to jointly managing diplomatic mediation to protect both country's strategic interests.

Further complicating the mosaic of actors and interests at play, a recent statement from Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi — an adamant and open supporter of Haftar — on June 20th announced that, if the GNA had crossed the "red line" that connects Sirte to the Al Jufra airbase, his troops would have "intervened directly" in Libya. Although it is difficult to assess whether Al Sisi’s claim is bluster or not, with the fate of its Western neighbor in the balance, the Egyptian threat is most likely sincere, driven by concern over the regional balance of power. Indeed, Egypt, as it is true for Haftar’s other foreign allies, is unwilling to risk that Sirte, the gateway to oil infrastructure on the Libyan coast, falls into the hands of pro-Turkish forces.

In the cacophony of conflicting interests, one thing stands clear: in the panorama of today's Middle East and North Africa,  the vast array of actors — including both principal regional powers like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE and extra-regional actors such as Russia — hold little or no interest in resolving the Libyan or Syrian conflicts for their own sakes. Rather, each appears to be set on maintaining “lukewarm” conflict in the region, offloading their own conflicts with other powers to these conflict areas to compete indefinitely with rival powers. The result is two devastated countries perpetually divided, creating a perfect breeding ground for endless competition, negotiation, and comeuppance.

Needless to say, the highest price and most severe long-lasting consequences for the seemingly endless competition over regional power and influence won’t be paid by any of the foreign actors involved. On the contrary, as it is in Syria, the greatest burden of Libya's fragmentation and exploitation will be entirely borne by the Libyan people and their future generations.

 If EU Don’t Have Time to Do it Right
In hindsight, the 2011 NATO intervention and subsequent approach to the peace process by the major international actors involved in Libya lacked both a fundamental understanding of the country’s history and political coherency and a long-term strategy for its stabilization. The international community not only failed to consider Libya’s lack of strong governmental institutions capable of saddling the burden of transitional government from a single central authority to a multi-party democratic state, but its highly unconventional statehood.

It would have been extremely relevant to consider, for example, that until 1963 — the year al-Qaddafi took power in the country — Libya was constituted by three governing provinces with little common history with one another and, therefore, that the risk of internal fragmentation was not only high, but historically rooted. Ipso facto, the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) that followed the revolution, promoted and supported by the UN, failed to address the high degree of hybridity within the country, particularly so by failing to include Haftar — the head of the Libyan National Army and de facto the strongest player in the Libyan context — in the reconstruction effort. Moreover, the agreement and the ensuing peace process fostered by the UN failed to acknowledge the country’s intrinsic economic fragility and societal cleavages.

The headstrong political will of some countries to achieve a rapid regime change had, as a consequence, not only underestimated the importance of assessing the intrinsic features of Libya, but the sacrifice of planning a long-term strategy for stabilization. During an interview on April 11th, 2016, former U.S. President Barack Obama admitted that the lack of planning for a post-Qaddafi Libya was probably the "worst mistake" of his presidency. Considering the high degree of instability and unrest in Libya today, it is hard to disagree with him.

Nonetheless, today’s leaders of the liberal order seem unwilling to apply the lessons learned from their mistakes in Libya. The Berlin Conference in January was yet another exercise in historical blindness and political bluster. Rather than a peace conference on Libya, for the EU and its member states, the Berlin summit translated into a summit to weigh and protect the Libyan interests that concerned them; achieving peace became more of a side-effect than a principal aim. Indeed, since the Libyan crisis erupted, Europeans have remained mainly concerned with just three things: oil, terrorism, and immigration.

Nevertheless, credit where credit is due, it must be recognized that, at least in these three strategic interests, there has been substantial improvement. Since 2016, Haftar has succeeded in gaining control of and reopening most of the oil facilities in the country — and therein lies the explanation for the sudden and informal endorsement of countries such as France. Meanwhile, the once well-established Islamic State suffered heavy defeats both by Haftar’s and Serra’s coalitions and has now almost completely disappeared from the country. Finally, regarding the issue of migration that has been the priority issue in Libya for the EU since 2015, the “secret” agreements of 2017 between Italy and the Tripolitania militias have drastically reduced the flow of migrants and refugees from sub-Saharan Africa — although at the price of massive human trafficking and thousands of people being locked up and tortured in decrepit prisons along the Libyan coast, as has been denounced by several INGOs, including Doctors Without Borders.

If Libyan post-conflict management were measured on the basis of the three strategic issues discussed above — leaving to one side the questionable means and strategies employed — one might call it a success. However, in the years after the controversial Libyan revolution, these interests have been put before any concrete attempt to foster peace, a transitional government, or political stabilization. As a result, the country has become a mere chessboard for international competition and special interests while the Libyan people are regarded as mere bargaining chips.

Europe’s game of hedging isn’t just failing to stabilize Libya; Europe is risking its own interests through its lack of coordinated action. The obsession of EU members with halting refugee flows and migration, ending the threat of terrorism in Europe, and preserving their access to Libyan oil so completely clouds their judgment that it prevented them from seeing that, over the years, Libya was being molded into the perfect ground for an international proxy conflict. The plays being made by Ankara, Moscow, Abu Dhabi, and others in Libya today are the result. The geopolitical chess game playing out in North Africa not only threatens to reverse all progress the EU has made over migration, terrorism, and oil security, but plunge the region into a Syria-level conflict which would likely see millions flee the country for European shores, herald the end of Libyan oil exports to Europe for the better part of a decade, and the rise of another terrorist organization — this time just under 1,000 kilometers from the EU.

As long as the country remains the theater of a complex game of chess between competing regional and international powers seeking to play kingmaker, Libya will remain divided and volatile. At present, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey are on the front line. If the success of the GNA rides on Ankara's actions, so too will Haftar's fate be increasingly written in Abu Dhabi than in Benghazi.

EU Must Have Time to Do it Over
In order to resolve the current impasse, the International Community — and in particular, EU member states and their allied stakeholders — should first agree on a common and long-term approach. In this respect, Italy, and France — the two EU member states with the most sway over the conflict — supporting opposite sides is not only counterproductive, but risks jeopardizing the credibility of the EU as an independent and unified international actor. Converging on a common view and policy on the Libyan conflict does not require the EU to throw its support behind either Haftar or al-Serraj, but rather approach the conflict with the principal object of a diplomatic settlement that provides for a robust transition period and achieves sustainable peace in Libya.

At the moment, Europe has neither the political will nor the capacity for military intervention or large-scale material support on behalf of the fragile GNA government. Even if this were not the case, having a more heavily-equipped NATO spearhead another intervention is not an option given U.S. President Trump’s limited interest in Libya, following the defeat of the Islamic State and mistrust of NATO itself. In fact, any attempted military intervention or support for armed conflict on behalf of Serraj would more than likely accelerate Libya’s path towards Syrianization, further destabilize the region, and exacerbate international political conflict between the EU, Russia, Turkey, the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia — to say nothing of the great cost in human lives a military escalation would cause.

There is a clear alternative path for Brussels and other European capitals to take. The EU, with the inclusion of as many parties as possible, must undertake a new approach to crisis management in Libya. Instead of a military-led pursuit of peace, European states should apply the depths of their economic and political soft power to stabilize Libya and help a transitional government to address the underlying issues that have led to conflict.

A frank assessment of the conflict belies deep mistrust across factions, making a country-wide reconciliation is inviable in the short term. However, as Libya’s conflict is predicated more on the basis of economic, financial, and resource disparities, and less on an ideological basis, the EU can redirect its focus in diplomatic mediation towards a political agreement that ensures an integration and fair distribution of the country's resources — in particular oil, gas, and freshwater. Not only will this serve to stabilize Libya (and therefore also reduce the porousness of country’s borders), but an equitable arrangement that satisfies belligerent parties is the first step to restoring the Libyan economy to its pre-2011 state — a time when the country was a key business partner of the EU.

A successful politico-economic settlement will likely also generate a spill-over effect that eases tensions also at the political and military level, which would enable European mediators to better negotiate the formation of a new transitional government. This can only be achieved while keeping the country’s unique political and demographic makeup front-of-mind. The country’s fractured political and tribal nature suggests that a decentralized government with robust federal institutions and a commitment to the rule of law has the best chance of success in stabilizing the country. Brussels should push for a federal constitution based on a high degree of autonomy in Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan. Brussels should then offer to support Libya’s democratic transition and the development of a strong rule of law through the creation of legislative and judicial working groups between Libyan and European officials and envoys.

Depending upon the political will of Libyan representatives to a settlement, the drafting of an amended version of Libya’s former constitution (1963) might obviate the need to draft an entirely new constitution. It might be prudent, and perhaps guarantee impartiality where the interests of all parties are concerned, to agree upon a new Libyan Crown Prince. Another effective, perchance more democratic solution would be the establishment of either a universally-elected presidency, or one that rotates between the three regions. Regardless, at least during transition, the central government should not reside in Tripoli, (whose fragile security situation leaves much to be desired) or Sirte, as both are highly contested, and therefore politically divisive. A temporary alternative seat of government could be set up in the city of Benghazi.

The lack of reliable, effective, and impartial security forces in Libya will undoubtedly be the first complex obstacle to overcome to achieve even partial stability following an agreement. Diplomatic and material support from Europe must also flow in that direction. Regardless of Brussels’ resolve, it would be nonetheless naïve to assume that investing in the creation of a stronger national law enforcement apparatus will at once put an end to the existence of belligerent armed groups. Several have grown powerful and influential during the conflict. Forcibly removing them would prove preventively costly for any internal or external actor. The only feasible solution is a complex process of re-integration of these groups into Libya’s own military and national guard, and train them to comply with and uphold the rule of law. EU and NATO countries should offer to work with and provide training to these newly integrated units and provide limited protection for key facilities during the transition.

Accomplishing any one of these objectives will not be a straightforward task. They will require both iron commitment from European capitals and the fullest dedication on the part of EU negotiators — a considerable ask in the face of the challenges that Europe faces today. Nevertheless, if the conference of Berlin taught anything, it is that words and joint statements of the kind Merkel had so much praise for are insufficient to move the needle in Libya. Europe must secure the endorsement of both Haftar and Al Serraj and dedicate more than conference room space to the peace process.

It is not only in Europe’s interest, but incumbent upon its leaders to prevent Libya from collapsing. Oil security in Libya (particularly at a time when Europe is increasingly interested in divesting from its reliance on Russia), the prevention of a yet another refugee crisis in the Mediterranean, and regional security against a resurgence of terrorism in Europe’s Southern neighborhood are all reason enough, on their own merits, to warrant Europe's full attention.

After more than a decade of conflict and failed attempts at quick fixes, it should be clear now that a sustainable peace will require Europe to implement a more comprehensive long-term approach to Libya. This will inevitably prove an unpalatable political reality in Brussels. A successful EU-led transition in Libya will require a wholly-united European Union, political courage, significant strategic patience, effective diplomacy, and a major investment of resources. Nonetheless, the longer Europe stands by, a mere spectator in a chess game that threatens its long-term interests, the greater the likelihood it finds itself on the wrong side of a checkmate.

Davide Broll

Director, Middle East & North Africa Programme

LinkedIn

Edited by: Cameron Vaské (contributing)

All views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of The International Scholar or any other organization.

Banner photo credits:

• Prime Minister Boris Johnson visits Berlin for the Libya Peace Conference., by Number 10, Flickr,
  https://www.flickr.com/photos/number10gov/49410745892/in/photolist-2iqzXcX-2ihb3N1-2ihcwcJ-25uMaQt-2ihcz8J-2ihfZiW-2ihcw8a-2iheWY6-9yKdPy-eaC7f4